

Mag. iur. Dr. techn. Michael Sonntag

Automating security checks

E-Mail: sonntag@fim.uni-linz.ac.at http://www.fim.uni-linz.ac.at/staff/sonntag.htm Institute for Information Processing and Microprocessor Technology (FIM) Johannes Kepler University Linz, Austria

© Michael Sonntag 2010

Agenda

- - Michael Sonntag

- Why automatization?
- What can be automated?
- Example: Skipfish
- How reliable are these tools?
- Practical examples of searching for vulnerabilities:
 - Information collection with NMap
 - Password cracking (John the Ripper, Ophcrack)
 - Exploit scanning with Nessus

Why automatization?

- Ensuring security is not that hard for a single system
 - → You know it in detail
 - → When something is discovered, it is implemented and tested
- But: Many sites with many configuration options?
 - \rightarrow Do you know them all?
 - » Are they identical everywhere (versions!)?
 - Do you have time to change everything accordingly? » Or do you depend on automatic updates/roll-out?
 - Are you sure you did not miss one option somewhere?
 » Testing the same thing several times is tedious
- Solution: Automatic testing whether a problem exists
 - → Professionals write tests → You just apply them »No need to know exactly how the attack works!
 - → Regular re-testing is possible

→ Ad-hoc & patchy testing → Systematic & comprehensive Michael Sonntag

Overlap with monitoring

- Some overlap with system monitoring exists
 - \rightarrow Failures are just a "different kind" of attack
 - → Some problems may occur accidentally or intentionally » Example: Blacklisting of mail servers
 - → Monitoring may uncover exploitation of a problem
 » Will not find how the attacker hacked the system, but that, e.g. through increased load, huge outgoing traffic, …
- But there are some important differences:
 - Monitoring knows in advance what to look for, security requires frequent updates for newly discovered problems
 - → Monitoring takes place more frequently
- Similar software/integration possible, but not the same!

Overlap with hacking

- Tools are available to search for vulnerabilities
 - \rightarrow These can be used for identifying the fact, to fix them (good)
 - \rightarrow Or for later exploiting them (bad)
 - → It depends on the intention and whose system is scanned
- Note: Various tools exist, which do not only search for vulnerabilities, but also exploit them
 - \rightarrow Injecting code, opening shells etc.
 - \rightarrow These are legally even more "dangerous"!
- Some tools cannot be assigned a "good" or "bad" class
 - → E.g. password cracking: The SW does exactly the same, and only the interpretation of the result/actions differs
- Here special care about the legality of the actions is needed
 Clear (ideally: written) permission by the owner of the system

What can be automated?

- Code tests: Analysis of source code
 - \rightarrow For known errors or potentially dangerous patterns
 - \rightarrow Or just trying: E.g. fuzzing (random input)
- Web application tests
 - \rightarrow Very important, because they are a regular source of problems and can be exploited from everyone at a distance \rightarrow Elevation of privilege \rightarrow Only your employees!
 - \rightarrow Examples: DNS hijacking, blacklisting, defacement, malware injection, suspicious account activity, specific exploits
- Properties of tests:
 - \rightarrow Probabilistic: Some tests give no definite answer; e.g. exploits that only work rarely (depending on memory layout, ...)
 - Destructive: Some tests will crash the software/system
 - \rightarrow Method vs. exploit: Checking for general method of attack (e.g. SQL injection) or testing a specific problem (typ. bug)?

6

Source code analysis

- Often external programs run on the source
 - → Better: Integration in development environment » Run continually, i.e. after every change/before compilation
- Checking for code problems
 - \rightarrow Can do a lot of analysis impossible later (compilation!)
 - \rightarrow Quality varies: Always a problem \leftrightarrow Rarely one
 - » Still: Every single issue must be investigated in detail!
- Typically static analysis, but need not be
 - \rightarrow Adding code for test runs, which identifies runtime problems
- Examples:
 - → Using unsafe methods ("sprintf" instead of "snprintf")
 - → Access to shared variable from multip. threads without locking
 - Accessing non-reserved memory; memory not freed
 - → Uninitialized variables, data tracing, duplicated code, …

Development environments: Eclipse & Java

- Integrated under Java Compiler Errors/Warnings
 - → Long list including other aspects
 - » E.g. code style \rightarrow understanding problems
- Checked whenever a Java file is saved
- Examples:
 - \rightarrow Assignment problems: x=x; if (x=y);
 - → Switch case fall through: case ?: x; case ?: …
 - → Null pointer access
 - → Dead code: if (false) …
 - Redundant/unnecessary code: unused variables
 - → Hidden fields/variables
 - → Overriding/no overriding methods

Most are not directly security relevant, but hint at bugs

 \rightarrow And bugs sometimes lead to security problems

Similarly: Validation of HTML/XML/JSP/... files

Automating security checks

8

Web: Various problems

- DNS Hijacking: Modification of DNS server/responses
 - → Redirecting requests to other IP addresses
 - → Requires checking various DNS servers all over the world »Not a guarantee, however!
- Domain Hijacking (theft): Transfer of the domain name to a different owner; typ. also to a different server
 - → Verification of the registrar information/WhoIS
- Defacement: Modification of the website by a third party
 - \rightarrow Typically the result of a hack
 - → Difficult to distinguish automatically from authorized modifications and for dynamic pages (e.g. blogs)
- Certificates: HTTPS certificate valid, identical, not insecure
 → E.g. replaced certificate (→ hack)

Web: Blacklisting

- Possible for both websites and E-Mail
 - \rightarrow May be based on domain name or IP address
- E-Mail: Spam, phishing
 - → Sources: SpamHaus, SURBL
- Web: Spam, phishing, virus, exploits, popups, …
 - → E.g. Norton safe Web, Google Safe browsing, Site Advisor
 - \rightarrow Marked as inappropriate for children (\rightarrow minor protection!)
- Possible reasons:
 - Someone hacked your site/placed malware on it
 - → Someone sent spam with you as sender/over your mailserver
 - → Incorrect message sent to owner of list
- Can be difficult to get off the list!

Web: Malware injection

- Adding JavaScript to the webpage or code to the source
 - → Intention: Infecting the computer of the browser
 - → Will typically not be a (technical!) problem for your server » But will probably be a legal problem!
- Requires a bug or lacking security on your site
- Example: Hidden iframe (size: 1x1 pixel, hidden)
 - → Often created through (nested) obfuscated scripts
 - \rightarrow Then used for drive-by downloads
- Can be very difficult to detect, as the code can be obfuscated, randomly modified etc.
 - → Typical solution: Compare with known-good page/source
 - → Alternative: Check for suspicious activity/links/frames
 - → Alternative: Use real browser and monitor actions

12

Checks whether an account has been hijacked

- → So typically user-oriented, but also for servers » Systematic problem allowing hijacking, not trojan on client » Typical problem: Cross Site Scripting (XSS)
 - Steal session ID \rightarrow change password \rightarrow own account
- Other elements may be checked as well: Used for sending Spam, phishing, illegal activity, credit card fraud etc.
 - → This is typically very specific for the individual site and therefore not available in general!
- Typical signs for account hijacking:
 - → Log ins from different IPs/IPs in different countries
 - → Log-ins to multiple accounts from the same IP
- Cannot be distinguished from outside; requires software within or on the server
- Basic vulnerabilities can be discovered in other ways
 Michael Sonntag

General: Specific exploits

- This covers all kinds of vulnerabilities
 - → Web server, operating system, installed software, etc.
- Can be run from inside or outside; where attackers might be
 - → Reason: Inside protection is often much more lenient and when someone managed to get in, there should still be no obvious security problems
- Signatures are implemented as small scripts
 - → Each new attack/weakness/bug → New script » Requires continuous updating!
- Note: Will be used by attackers as well!
- Example: Nessus (see later)
- More exploit oriented: Metasploit
 - → Regularly used by attackers
 - \rightarrow Main element is exploitation, less finding a security problem

Example: Skipfish

- Web application security scanner
 - \rightarrow Will scan a whole site for various security problems
 - Very simple usage

Michael Sonntag

- Scans for various risk levels:
 - → High: SQL injection, command injection, file upload, …
 »Brute force: Huge logs, enormous time!
 - → Medium: Directory traversal, stored/reflected XSS, script/css injection, mixed content, MIME- and charset mismatches, incorrect caching directives, etc.
 - → Low: Directory listing, stored/reflected redirection, content embedding, mixed content, credentials in URLs, SSL certificates, forms without XSRF protection, …
- Allows partial checking (checks take quite long)
 - → X % of all links followed/problems checked
 - » Randomly determined → Regular scanning → Probably checked everything over some time!
 Automating security checks 14

Skipfish: How to scan

- Note: Skipfish has only a very limited database of known vulnerabilities
 - → Based on three-step differential probes » Uses wordlists to look for extensions and for filling in forms
- Skipfish is provided as source code
 - → For a Linux-like environment (Mac, Cygwin, …)
 - → Just run "make" to compile it
- Select a dictionary to use
 - Note: The bigger the dictionary, the longer the scan takes!

Start it on command line with output directory and URL

→ Additional parameters allow restricting the depth, percentage of links followed, specify authentication cookies (to get around logins), connection rate limiting, …

• Example: ./skipfish -o output_dir http://www.example.com/

Output interpretation

Skipfish:

 Output is produced as an annotated sitemap → First line can expand Below: Problems found in decreasing importance with brief explanation → Note: Many things not necessarily a problem! » E.g. PUT: If file upload is intended, this is OK (here it is not ☺!) Note: Took 88 hours, but is not even remotely complete!

Skipfish - scan results browser	+				NO
absoleal	Scanner version: Random seed:	1.33b 0x83340d23	Scan date: Total time:	Mon May 3 07:47:41 2010 88 hr 45 min 51 sec 492 ms	
ski <i>p</i> fish			Problems wit	h this scan? Click here for advic	e.
Crawl results - click	to expand	l:			_
http://www.com/orefull of 6 045 040 78 0122 441 Code: 200, length: 16108, declared: text/html, detected: application/xhtml+xml, charset: iso-8859-1 [show trace +]					
Document type over	rview - clic	ek to exp	and:		-
application/javascript	(7)				
application/xhtml+xm	application/xhtml+xml (18)				
image/gif (10)					
image/jpeg (1)					
image/png (29)					
text/css (6)					
text/html (9)					
text/plain (6)					
text/xml (3)					

Issue type overview - click to expand:

PUT request accepted (5)

- http://www.clickheat/index.php/PUT-sfi9876 [show trace+]
 http://www.clickheat/index.php/images/PUT-sfi9876 [show trace+]
 http://www.clickheat/index.php/images/flags/PUT-sfi9876 [show trace+]
 http://www.clickheat/index.php/sfi9876/PUT-sfi9876 [show trace+]
 http://www.clickheat/index.php/styles/PUT-sfi9876 [show trace+]
 SOL query or similar syntax in parameters (1)
- lnteresting file (1)

Reliability

- Reliability of automated security checks is very mixed
 - → Specific exploit code tested → Perfect (attack did work)
 - \rightarrow General programming style \rightarrow Might sometimes be a problem
- Typical scans always produce a large number of warnings
 - → Your SSL certificate is not an officially recognized one, users can upload files, character set mismatches (alone unimportant, but together with user-contributed content this may suddenly becomes dangerous!)
 - → Investigate in detail the first time
 - Later on: Check for modifications only!
 - » Something new, something "enlarged" (more files) etc.
 - » Therefore they work best for relatively "static" webpages
 - Meaning that structure and programming remains the same, not necessarily the actual content shown on the pages!

NMap

- NMap (Network MAPper) is a network scanner
 - → It tries to find all computers in a specific network and checks, what ports are open, what OS they are running, whether there is a firewall, etc.
- It does not look for specific vulnerabilities!
 - → But it gives recommendations; e.g. services to disable
 - → Some scans + vuln. systems → Lock-up/crash!
- Used as a tool for inventory generation in a network
 - → Are there any computers which should not be there?
 - → Can also be used to gather information for a later attack » Which OS/software and which version is running
- Stages: 1 = Host discovery, 2 = Port scan, 3 = Service/ version detection, 4 = OS detection, 5 = Scripting

Scripting may also include vulnerability/malware detection!



- Usage: Trivial!
 - → Start program and enter IP address
 - → Select profile for scanning
 - » Special options only available in the command line version or when constructing a new profile!
- More complex options:
 - → Stealth scans
 - » Trying to not show up on various statistics

Sample result: NMap local subnet scan

I M		am
E	NMap local	su
	◆Zenmap B	
	Sc <u>a</u> n <u>T</u> ools <u>P</u> rofile <u>H</u> elp	
_	New Scan Command Wizard Save Scan Open Scan Report a bug Help	
	Operating System Detection on 140.78.100.31 🗶 Regular Scan on 140.78.100.244 🗶 Regular Scan on 140.78.100.128/25 🗶	
	Target: 140.78.100.128/25 Profile: Regular Scan	Scan
	Command: nmap -v 140.78.100.128/25	
	Hosts Services Ports / Hosts Nmap Output Host Details Scan Details	
	OS 4 Host Host <u>koeck.fim.uni</u> - <u>linz.ac.at</u> (140.78.100.172) appears to be up	
	Interesting ports on <u>koeck.fim.uni-linz.ac.at</u> (140.78.100.172):	
	hp2626-1a.fim.uni-linz.a Not shown: 1710 filtered ports	
	pp2824-la.rm.uni-in2.a 139/tcp open netbios-ssn	
	hp2824-2a.fim.uni-linz.a 445/top open microsoft-ds	
	8009/tcp open ajp13	
	 hplj4100dtn.fim.uni-linz. 8080/tcp open http-proxy holi4100dtn-2.fim.uni-lin MAC Address: 00:04:75:76:22:22 (3 Com) 	
	 in hplj4100dtn-2.fim.uni-lir jrm_w2k.fim.uni-linz.ac., Host 140.78.100.182 appears to be up good. 	
	son wxp.ads-fim.fim.un	
	koeck.fim.uni-linz.ac.at PORT STATE SERVICE	
	140.78.100.182 135/tcp open msrpc	
	Image: subscription of the second	
	hoer_xp64.fim.uni-linz.a	
	alex_w2k.fim.uni-linz.ac Host <u>susanne_xp.ads</u> - <u>fim.fim.uni</u> - <u>linz.ac.at</u> (140.78.100.199) appears	
	bartpe-16534 140.78.10 to be up good. Interesting ports on susanne xp.ads-fim.fim.uni-linz.ac.at	
	inge_stap04pc.ads-fim.f (140.78.100.199):	
	Not shown: 1712 filtered ports PORT STATE SERVICE	
	139/tcp open netbios-ssn	
	443/tcp open https	
	Enable Nmap output highlight Preferences Refresh	

Michael Sonntag

Sample result: NMap OS detection

	M		Sample result:
	₽ <i>Ш≦</i>		NMap OS detection
ļ		◆Zenmap Scan Tools Profile Help	
		New Scan Command Wizard Save Scan Open Scan Report a bug Help	
		Operating System Detection on 140.78.100.31 🗙	
		Target: 140.78.100.31 Profile: Operating System De	etection Scan
		Command: nmap -O -v 140.78.100.31	
		Hosts Services Ports / Hosts Nmap Output Host Details Scan Details OS Host Image: router.fim.uni-linz.ac.at 140.78.100.31	
		Comments	
		IPv4: 140.78.100.31 IPv6:	
		MAC:	
		Hostnames Name - Type: router.fim.uni-linz.ac.at - PTR	
		• Operating System	
		TCP Sequence Difficulty: Good luck!	
		Index: 258	
		Values:	
		Class: All zeros	
		Values:	
		Class: none returned (unsupported) Values:	

Sample result: NMap OS detection

	M		Sample result:
ſ	₽ŰŸ	N	lap OS detection
		Scan Iools Profile Help New Scan Command Wizard Save Scan Open Scan Report a bug Help	
		Operating System Detection on 140.78.100.31 Profile: Operating System Detection Command: nmap -0 -v 140.78.100.31 Hosts Services Ports / Hosts Nmap Output Host Details Scan Details OS ↓ Host Provide: fim.uni-linz.ac.at 140.78.100.31 Comments Post Status State: up Open ports: 1 Filtered ports: 1005 Closed ports: 1715 Up time: Not available E Addresses Hostnames Operating System TCP Sequence IP 1D Sequence ICP 5 Sequence Class: none returned (unsupported) Values: Values: 	

Sample result: NMap OS detection

1	₽ <u></u>		ble result: 6 detection
ļ		◆Zenmap Scan Tools Profile Help	
		October October Image: Scan Command Wizard Save Scan Open Scan Report a bug Help	
		Operating System Detection on 140.78.100.31 🗙	
		Target: 140.78.100.31 Profile: Operating System Detection Scan	
		Command: nmap -O -v 140.78.100.31	
		Hosts Services Ports / Hosts Nmap Output Host Details Scan Details	
		OS ◀ Host router.fim.uni-linz.ac.at	
		Addresses	
		Hostnames Operating System	
		Name: Cisco C3500XL switch (IOS 12.0(5)) Accuracy: 91%	
		Ports used	
		Port-Protocol-State: 514 - tcp - open Port-Protocol-State: 1 - tcp - closed	
		OS Class Type Vendor OS Family OS Generation Accuracy	
		switch Cisco IOS 12.X 96%	
		switch Cisco IOS 12.2 93%	
		switch Cisco embedded	
		router Cisco IOS 12.X 85%	
		TCP Sequence	

Michael Sonntag

John the Ripper

- Password cracking tool
 - → Uses word lists as well as brute-force
 - » Word lists can be "multiplied" by mangling rules (reverse, ...)
 - Note: Long lists take longer, but provide better chances!
 - »Brute force: Define character set and set password length limit
 - → Can also be used as password-strength checking module
 - → "Reconstructs" the password from its hash
 - » Therefore requires access to the password file!
 - Can be interrupted and restarted (may take a long time!)
- Supported are the following password hash types
 - → crypt(3) hash types: traditional & double-length DES-based, BSDI extended DES-based, FreeBSD MD5-based (also used on Linux, Cisco IOS), OpenBSD Blowfish-based (also used on some Linux distr.), Kerberos/AFS, Windows NT/2000/XP LM DES-based

Michael Sonntag

» More with additional patches!

Ophcrack

- Password cracking tool for Windows
- \rightarrow LAN Manager/NT LAN Manager hashes (i.e. Win passwords) » LM / NTLM hashes (not stored in cleartext, but as hash only) » Windows Vista has the (easier) LM hashes disabled by default Older versions still store the weak LM for backwards compatibility \rightarrow Can import the hashes from various formats or read it directly Based on Rainbow tables and brute force \rightarrow Some are freely available, others cost money » You could theoretically create them yourself, but this is an extremely time- and resource-intensive activity! → Free tables: About 99.9 % coverage for alphanumeric passwords of up to 14 characters (LM), 99% for NTLM » All printable chars/symbols/space (NT/Vista); German \rightarrow á US\$ 99

Rainbow tables

- Reducing time by investing memory
 - → "Pre-computed passwords"
- Simplest form: Generate all passwords + their hashes and store them for later lookup (immediate cracking!)
 - → Drawback: Gigantic table!
- Rainbow tables: Compute all passwords, but store only a small part of them → After finding the hash, some time is required to obtain the actual password
 - \rightarrow Time is reduced by the square of the available memory
- Countermeasure: Use "salting"
 - → A random value is generated, prepended to the password, and stored
 - → Rainbow table would have to be enlarged for the salt »4 char salt + 14 char password → 18 char rainbow table!

Michael Sonntag Philippe Oechslin: Ophcrack http://lasecwww.epfl.ch/~oechslin/projects/ophcrack/

Ophcrack: LM hashes

• Windows password hashes have several problems

- → LM are effectively 2 passwords of 7-characters
- → LM passwords are converted to uppercase
- → LM and NTLM do not employ any "salting" » This is why rainbow tables are feasible here!
- How to disable at least the especially weak LM hashes:
 - » Attention: Will not allow connecting from Windows ME/98/... computers any more!

» Disabled by default on Windows Vista

→ Set the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Lsa\NoLMHash to 1



- Nessus is a scanner for vulnerabilities
 - → Based on signatures → Finds only known problems! » Currently about 41500 plugins
 - No installation on FAT disks \rightarrow Too many files in a single directory!
- Updating the signatures: Possible/Automatic
- First step: Identify OS → Almost all vuln. depend on this
 → Registry, SNMP, ICMP, MSRPC, NTP
- Second step: Check which vuln. might apply and test them
 - Not by actually exploiting them, only whether it would work!
- From where to run the scan?
 - → Outside: Probably already safe, best to be sure
 - → Inside (Critical machines): Defence in depth
 - \rightarrow DMZ: One computer was hacked \rightarrow Others still secure?
- Commercial use/additional functionality → You have to pay!
 - \rightarrow US\$ 1200 per scanner per year

Nessus

- Nessus is separated into a daemon and a client
 - \rightarrow Scanning is done by the daemon(s); the client is just an UI
 - \rightarrow Can do more intensive scanning if provided credentials for logging on to a computer
- Vulnerabilities are scripted in NASL
 - \rightarrow Nessus Attack Scripting Language (see next page) » You can write your own too!
 - Detection is not perfect: False positives my occur
- Attention: Some scans can crash the target!
 - \rightarrow Take care before enabling "all" scans!
 - → Option "Safe checks" disables anything dangerous and checks through banners only; no actual trying
- Found a vulnerability? Fix it!
 - → Prioritize the problems detected
 - Bugtraq ID or CVE number for obtaining further information



Nessus: NASL example (phpcms_xss.nasl)

if(description)

script_id(15850); script_version("\$Revision: 1.5 \$"); script_cve_id("CVE-2004-1202"); script_bugtraq_id(11765);

script_name(english:"phpCMS XSS");

desc["english"] = "

The remote host runs phpCMS, a content management system written in PHP.

This version is vulnerable to cross-site scripting due to a lack of sanitization of user-supplied data in parser.php script. Successful exploitation of this issue may allow an attacker to execute malicious script code on a vulnerable server.

```
Solution: Upgrade to version 1.2.1pl1 or newer Risk factor : Medium";
```

```
script_description(english:desc["english"]);
script_summary(english:"Checks phpCMS XSS");
script_category(ACT_GATHER_INFO);
script_copyright(english:"This script is Copyright (C) 2004 David Maciejak");
script_family(english:"CGI abuses : XSS");
script_require_ports("Services/www", 80);
script_dependencie("http_version.nasl", "cross_site_scripting.nasl");
exit(0);
```

include("http_func.inc"); include("http_keepalive.inc");

port = get_http_port(default:80); if (! get_port_state(port))exit(0); if (! can_host_php(port:port)) exit(0);

if (get_kb_item("www/" + port + "/generic_xss")) exit(0);


- r = http_keepalive_send_recv(port:port, data:buf, bodyonly:1); if(r == NULL)exit(0);

if(egrep(pattern:"<script>foo</script>", string:r))
{
 security_warning(port);
 exit(0);
}

Nessus: Sample results


E			Sam
	Ressus : C:/Document	s and Settings/SONNTAG.ADS-FIM/My Documents/Te	nable/Nessus Clier 🕒 💶 🗙
	TENABLE NESS	us3	Nessus
	Scan Report		
	Report:	08/05/29 12:10:37 PM - Complete	
		Information about the remote host : Operating system : Microsoft Windows XP Professional (G NetBIOS name : SON DNS name : son_acer8.fim.uni-lin;	ACER8
	Disconnect		

Nessus: Sample results



 $|U|^{\leq}$

Nessus: Sample results



114

٦

- 140.78.100.166

- general/icmp

--- general/tcp --- general/udp

- ntp (123/u...

- netbios-ss...

microsoft-...

telexis-vtu...

epmap (13...

···· netbios-ns...

Flash Player APSB07-12

The remote Windows host contains a browser plugin that is affected by multiple issues.

Description :

Synopsis :

According to its version number, the instance of Flash Player on the remote Windows host could allow for arbitrary code execution by means of a malicious SWF file.

In addition, it may also fail to sufficiently validate the HTTP Referer header, which may aid in cross-site request forgery attacks. This issue does not, though, affect Flash Player 9.

See also :

http://www.adobe.com/support/security/bulletins/apsb07-12.html

Solution :

Upgrade to Flash Player version 9.0.47.0 / 8.0.35.0 / 7.0.70.0 or later.

Risk factor :

High / CVSS Base Score : 9.3 (CVSS2#AV:N/AC:M/Au:N/C:C/I:C/A:C)

Plugin output :

Nessus has identified the following vulnerable instance(s) of Flash Player installed on the remote host :

- ActiveX control (for Internet Explorer) : C:\WINDOWS\system32\macromed\flash\flash.ocx, 7.0.14.0

CVE : CVE-2007-3456, CVE-2007-3457 BID : 24856

Nessus ID : <u>25694</u>

Nessus: Sample results

CVSSv2 (Base metrics only!):

•Access Vector: Network

- •Access Complexity: Medium
- •Authentication: None
- •Confidentiality: Complete
- •Integrity: Complete
- •Availability: Complete
- Result: Base score 9.3
 - Impact Subscore: 10

Exploitability Subscore: 8.6

CVE-2007-3456:

Integer overflow in Adobe Flash Player 9.0.45.0 and earlier might allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a large length value for a (1) Long string or (2) XML variable type in a crafted (a) FLV or (b) SWF file, related to an "input validation error," including a signed comparison of values that are assumed to be non-negative.

Conclusions

- Automatic checking is very useful, but requires typically a lot of work for configuring
 - → Including the first run: Investigate and decide what are false positives or can be ignored
 - → Ideally the software can compare it against a "baseline" and show only the changes
- Only useful if really fully automated
 - Can be ignored completely unless something happens
- More security checks become integrated into development
 - → Later on it becomes expensive
 - \rightarrow Big danger: Too many \rightarrow Disable/auto-ignore them
 - » E.g. Eclipse: Only disabling by type, but must not by instance
 - "Here it is intentional/not a problem, but warn me about all others"

If you are not using this software, the attackers will!

Questions?

Thank you for your attention!

F

Literature

- Java: FindBugs http://findbugs.sourceforge.net/index.html
- C/C++: Valrgind http://valgrind.org/
- Web: Skipfish http://code.google.com/p/skipfish/
- Ophcrack: http://ophcrack.sourceforge.net/
- Nessus: http://www.nessus.org/
- General: Metasploit http://www.metasploit.com/